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Abstract
The present study examined the impact of divided attention on children’s and adults’ neutral and
negative true and false memories in a standard DRM paradigm. Children (7- and 11-year-olds; n =
126) and adults (n = 52) received 5 neutral and 5 negative DRM word lists where half of each
group received a divided attention task. The results showed that divided attention affected
children’s and adults’ false memory levels differently, but did not alter true memory differently.
Specifically, our results revealed a developmental shift in that divided attention lowered children’s
false memory rates, but increased adults’ false memory rates, regardless of the nature of the
material (i.e., neutral or negative). Our study indicates that manipulations that target conscious
processing (e.g., divided attention) result in marked qualitative and quantitative differences
between children’s and adults’ false memories but not true memories.
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  Dividing Attention Lowers Children’s, but Increases Adults’ False Memories
Memory scholars have become increasingly interested in examining developmental
differences in memory, particularly the development of spontaneous memory illusions that reduce
overall memory accuracy (e.g., Brainerd, Reyna, & Ceci, 2008; Otgaar & Candel, in press;
Wimmer & Howe, 2010). A widely-used memory paradigm to investigate spontaneous memory
illusions is the Deese/Roediger-McDermott (DRM) paradigm (Deese, 1959; Roediger &
McDermott, 1995). Here, participants study lists of semantically-related words (e.g., table, sit,
legs, couch) all of which are related to a non-presented critical lure (e.g., chair). When memory is
tested for these words (either recall or recognition), a significant proportion of participants falsely
remember the non-presented critical lure with rates often comparable to memory for the studied
words (Roediger & McDermott, 1995). In developmental studies, a typical finding is that young
children are less susceptible to spontaneous memory illusions than older children and adults (e.g.,
Howe, Wimmer, Gagnon, & Plumpton, 2009).
Several theories have been proffered as explanations of the mechanisms underlying the
development of the false memory illusion. Fuzzy-trace theory (FTT; Brainerd et al., 2008)
postulates that memories are stored as two opponent traces. Verbatim traces store item-specific
surface characteristics (e.g., font of a word) of information while gist traces store meanings of the
information being processed. According to FTT, false memories arise mainly due to reliance on
gist traces as verbatim traces become weaker and less available in memory. FTT posits that false
memories are less robust in children because they are poorer at extracting the overall theme (gist)
of DRM lists. Because gist extraction improves with age in childhood, spontaneous false
memories increase throughout development.
Alternatively, associative-activation theory (AAT; Howe et al., 2009), which is partly
based on activation-monitoring theory (AMT; Roediger, Watson, McDermott, & Gallo, 2001b),
stipulates that both true and false memories arise out of automatic associative processes
(Roediger, Balota, & Watson, 2001a). The basic premise behind AAT is that the processing of one
word results in a spreading activation to corresponding nodes in our mental lexicon. According to
this theory, false memories arise because the presented words are all associated with the critical
lure that becomes activated when words are processed through spreading activation. AAT
contends that false memory creation is based on increases in the number and strength of
associative relations as well as the speed and automaticity with which these associations are
accessed and activated (Wimmer & Howe, 2009). Children’s and adults’ false memories differ in
the degree of automaticity of associative activation which in turn is driven by developments in
children’s knowledge base (see Howe, 2005; Howe & Wilkinson, 2011). The knowledge base is
composed of networks of interrelated concepts whose structure adapts with development and
experience. Specifically, with age, children become more able to automatically activate
associative networks and therefore they are better equipped to employ associative relations in
much the same manner as adults.
The difference between these theories is that FTT explains age-related increases in false
memories in terms of changes in gist extraction whereas AAT explains these same changes in
terms of changes in children’s knowledge base and the automaticity with which this information is
activated. Although both FTT (dual-process theory) and AAT (single-process theory) predict
quantitative changes in  false memories with age, only AAT anticipates qualitative changes in
children’s false memories as a consequence of these changes in automaticity (see later discussion
and Wimmer & Howe, 2010).
Recently, two lines of research have emerged that examined the precise circumstances
under which false memories increase or decrease in adults and children. One of those research
lines focused on whether false memories are consciously produced or whether they can also be
elicited unconsciously (e.g., Dodd & Macleod, 2004; Wimmer & Howe, 2010). The other research
line has concentrated on how emotion (valence-arousal effects) affects the development of false
memories (e.g., Brainerd, Holliday, Reyna, Yang, & Toglia, 2010; Howe, Candel, Otgaar,
Malone, & Wimmer, 2010; Otgaar, Candel, & Merckelbach, 2008). Up until now, no effort has
been made to combine these two research lines in one study and test whether there exist
developmental differences in this respect. Hence, the purpose of the present study was to examine
the effect of emotionality (valence-arousal) on children’s and adults’ false memory development
under conditions that adversely impact conscious processing (i.e., divided attention).
What does research tell us about the development of false memories under circumstances
that make it difficult to consciously study DRM word lists? Overall, research in this area has
mainly been carried out with adult participants and is related to work on subliminal semantic
priming (Greenwald, Abrams, Naccache, & Dehaene, 2003). Although studies show that in the
DRM paradigm, false memories may become consciously activated during study (McDermott,
1997), the general finding is that for adults, false memories occur automatically without conscious
awareness (e.g., Dodd & MacLeod, 2004; Kimball & Bjork, 2002). For example, Dodd and
MacLeod (2004) showed that false memories can be evoked when words are processed
incidentally. Also, other studies have shown that false memories even arise when adults receive
forewarning instructions about the possible occurrence of the false memory illusion (Peters et al.,
2008).
A more common method used to examine the automaticity of false memories is the
divided attention task. In this task, participants have to learn DRM lists while simultaneously
paying attention to a second task (e.g., the so-called “oddball” task such as identifying infrequent
high tones among frequent low tones). However, studies using divided attention tasks with adult
participants have failed to provide a consistent picture with respect to false memory development.
Some studies show that divided attention increases false memory illusions in both recall and
recognition procedures (e.g., Dewhurst, Barry, Swannell, Holmes, & Bathrust, 2007 (Experiment
1); Pérez-Mata, Read, & Diges, 2002; Peters et al., 2008) while other studies demonstrate that
false memory levels are lowered when attention is divided while studying the DRM word lists
(e.g., Dewhurst et al., 2007; Experiment 2).
Possible reasons for these conflicting results include the use of different secondary tasks
across studies which makes direct comparisons between studies complicated (Seamon et al.,
2003). Other reasons include the use of within- or between-subjects designs (e.g., Peters et al.,
2008; Wimmer & Howe, 2010) or the use of recall or recognition measures (e.g., Dewhurst et al.,
2007). Finally, most studies on the impact of divided attention on false memory rates have been
conducted using adult samples only.
As far as we know, there is only one study examining the effect of divided attention on
children’s false recognition (Wimmer & Howe, 2010; Experiment 2). In this study, children (7-
and 11-year-olds) and adults were subjected to a divided attention paradigm while receiving six
neutral DRM word lists. The study revealed two important findings. First, dividing attention
during encoding significantly reduced true, but not false, recognition regardless of age. Second,
they found that for children, true and false memory rates were strongly related to each other when
attention was divided. However, for adults, true and false memory rates were unrelated when
attention was divided. Wimmer and Howe (2010) argued that these results provide evidence for an
important qualitative developmental difference between children’s and adults’ false memory
production. The current study aimed to extend these findings by also examining the effect of
valence on children’s and adults’ false memory formation when attention is divided.
What do we know about the role of valence-arousal on children’s and adults’ false
memories? Overall, studies show a fairly consistent picture with respect to this issue. That is,
results demonstrate that children and adults falsely recognize more negative than neutral critical
lures, while false recall is higher for neutral than for negative lures (e.g., Brainerd et al., 2010;
Howe et al., 2010). To date, however, no study has investigated whether the effects of valence-
arousal on false memory differ developmentally when conscious processing of DRM lists is
interfered with: that is, when participants are involved in a divided-attention task.
To the best of our knowledge, there are no published studies that have investigated the
effect of divided attention on children’s and adults’ neutral and negative memory accuracy. We
selected 7- and 11-year-old children and adults in the present study as previous research has
shown that within these age categories, there is a significant developmental increase in the number
of false memories (e.g., Howe et al., 2009). In our study, children and adults received neutral and
negative DRM word lists with half of them also receiving a divided attention task (i.e., oddball
task). After each word list presentation, participants were instructed to report all the words they
could remember (i.e., free recall).
Based on previous studies (e.g., Howe et al., 2010), we expected all participants to falsely
recall more neutral false memories than negative ones. We predicted that divided attention would
affect children’s and adults’ false memories differently. Specifically, dividing attention should
decrease children’s false memories as it would either impede gist extraction (FTT) or hinder
spreading activation (AAT).  Because adults’ knowledge base is better developed and can be
accessed more automatically (outside conscious awareness) than children’s (AAT), dividing
attention will not lead to decreased false memory rates for adults’. In fact, false memory
production might even increase for adults’ if divided attention leads adults to rely more on the
themes that were activated during list presentation (AAT; Howe & Wilkinson, 2011) or on gist
rather than verbatim traces (FTT).
Method
Participants
Hundred-seventy-eight children and young adults (45% male) took part in the present
study with 78 7-year-olds (mean age = 7.41 years, SD = 0.55), 48 11-year-olds (mean age = 11.69,
SD = 0.51), and 52 young adults (mean age = 21.19 years, SD = 2.25). All children had parental
consent and received a small present for their participation. Adults received course credit for their
participation. This study was ethically approved.
Materials
Five neutral (bread, window, sweet, smoke, and foot) and five negative (murder, pain,
punishment, death, and cry) word lists were used in the present study with each containing 10
words. These lists have already proven their effectiveness in eliciting a substantial amount of
DRM-related false memories (Howe et al., 2010). List items were selected from the Dutch word
association norms (Van Loon-Vervoorn & Van Bekkum, 1991) and were presented in order of
backward associative strength, from strongest to weakest in line with Howe et al. (2010) and
Otgaar and Candel (in press) (but see other DRM-false memories studies in which words are
presented in order of forward associative strength; McEvoy et al., 1999). Using the Celex lexical
database (Baayen, Piepenbrock, & Gulikers, 1995), we ensured that the mean word frequency of
the neutral and emotional critical lures did not differ (t(8) = 0.22, ns). Furthermore, the mean
backward associative strength between the neutral list items and their critical lure and the mean
backward associative strength between the negative list items and their critical lures did not differ
(t(8) = 1.69, ns). To examine the properties of our lists more deeply, we also tabulated the mean
arousal and valence values of the lists and the critical lures using the ANEW norms (Bradley &
Lang, 1999; Appendix A) and also report the mean values of the following semantic properties:
concreteness, familiarity, and meaningfulness using norms from different databases (Gilhooly &
Logie, 1980; Toglia & Battig, 1978; see Appendix A). The lists were presented in a fixed random
order. Words were presented in an auditory manner at a 2 s rate on a computer using E-Prime
software.
For the divided attention task, we used an adapted version of the oddball paradigm used by
Peters and colleagues (2008). In a standard oddball task, participants are instructed to identify
infrequent “target” stimuli within a series of rapidly presented “standard” stimuli. We modified
the oddball task with E-Prime to make the task more child-friendly.  In our adapted version,
participants received a visual oddball task in which red and green smileys were shown. These
smileys were presented for 250 ms during the presentation of the DRM word lists on a 17-inch
computer screen. A smiley was shown before and after the presentation of a word. A fixation
cross appeared on the screen for 500 ms preceding each smiley that was presented before word
presentation. During each word list, a total of 20 smileys were presented with one smiley before
and after each word. The number of red smileys per word list ranged between 2 and 6
(approximately 10-30% of the smileys) to prevent the impact of guessing and predictability. After
each word list, participants who received the divided attention task were asked to indicate the
number of red smileys they had seen. In the control condition, the exact same task occurred except
no smileys were presented.
Design and Procedure
This experiment employed a 3 (Age: 7-year-olds vs. 11-year-olds vs. adults) x 2
(Condition: Full attention vs. divided attention) x 2 (Valence-Arousal: Negative vs. neutral) split-
plot design with the latter factor being a within-subject variable. Children and adults were
randomly allocated to the full attention (n = 92) or divided attention condition (n = 86).
Participants in the full attention condition received 10 DRM word lists with the instruction
to remember the words presented in these lists. The DRM word lists were presented in a fixed
random order. After each word list, participants had 1.5 min to recall all the words they could
recollect. Participants in the divided attention task first received information about the oddball
task to make sure that they understood the exact procedure. Specifically, they received pictures of
red and green smileys and were told that these smileys would be presented during the word
presentation and that they simultaneously had to remember words and count the number of red
smileys that they encountered. Like the full attention condition, word lists were presented in a
fixed random order. In the divided attention condition, after each word list, participants first had
to indicate verbally how many red smileys they had seen. Next, they were instructed to recall all
the words they could remember. This recall phase lasted for 1.5 min.
Results
True recall
Analyses of variance (ANOVA) were conducted to examine the effect of divided attention
on children’s and adults’ neutral and negative true and false memories. Post-hoc comparisons
were performed using Bonferroni tests. A 3 (Age: 7-year-olds vs. 11-year-olds vs. adults) x 2
(Condition: Full attention vs. divided attention) x 2 (Valence-Arousal: Negative vs. neutral)
ANOVA on the mean proportion true recall revealed a significant Age x Condition x Valence-
Arousal interaction, F(2,172) = 5.31, p < .01, ?2p = .06. Simple effect analyses showed the
following results. First, dividing attention during study significantly reduced true recall for all age
groups (p < .001; see Table 1). Second, we found that in the divided attention condition, neutral
words were significantly better remembered than negative words in all age groups (F(1,83) =
11.72, p < .001, ?2p = .12). However, this was not the case for participants in the full attention
condition. Here, our data revealed that for the 11-year-olds (F(1,23) = 13.36, p < .01, ?2p = .35),
neutral words were better recollected than negative words while young adults (F(1,25) = 5.67, p <
.05, ?2p = .19) remembered more negative than neutral words. For the 7-year-old group, this
difference was not significant (p > .05).
False recall
When we conducted a similar ANOVA on the false recall data, we found two important
results. First, our analysis revealed a significant main effect of valence-arousal (F(1,172) = 44.68,
p < .001, ?2p = .21; see Table 2) with neutral critical lures being more easily recollected than
negative critical lures. Second, we found a significant Age x Condition interaction (F(2,172) =
7.45, p < .001, ?2p = .08). Simple effects tests showed that divided attention significantly reduced
younger and older children’s false memory levels (F(1,122) = 4.98, p < .05, ?2p = .04), but
increased adults’ false memories (F(1,50) = 8.07, p < .01, ?2p = .14). When we ran analyses
separate for the effect of divided attention on younger and older children’s false memory levels,
we found that although dividing attention reduced both children’s false memory levels, this effect
was only significant for the older children (F(1,46) = 3.89, p < .05, ?2p = .08) and not for the
younger children (F(1,76) = 0.86, ns). This latter finding likely reflects a floor effect since
although divided attention decreased younger children’s false memory levels (full attention: M =
.15, divided attention, M = .12), false memory levels in this age group were very low (see Table
2).
We also found an age-related increase in false memories with 11-year-old children having
more false memories than 7-year-old children in both the full and divided attention conditions
(ps < .05). However, adults’ false memory rates were relatively low and these were not higher
than the 11-year-olds’ false memory rates in the full attention condition but were higher than the 7-
year-olds’ false memory rates in the divided attention condition (p < .01).
Net accuracy
To investigate whether divided attention would impact children’s and adults’ net accuracy,
we computed net accuracy scores (true recall/true recall + false recall; see Table 3). We found a
significant main effect of valence (F(1,172) = 28.75, p < .001, ?2p = .14) with negative net
accuracy scores being higher than neutral net accuracy scores (see Table 3). Furthermore, our
analysis showed a significant Age x Condition interaction (F(2,172) = 3.61, p < .05, ?2p = .04)
with simple effects indicating that adults’ net accuracy were significantly reduced when attention
was divided (F(1,50) = 11.06, p < .01, ?2p = .18), yet divided attention did not affect children’s
accuracy scores (p > .05).
Discussion
The present study was designed to examine the impact of divided attention on children’s
and adults’ neutral and negative true and false recall. Our most important finding was that divided
attention significantly affected children’s and adults’ false recall in opposite ways. Specifically,
when attention was divided in children, false memory rates were significantly reduced whereas
the reverse was true for adults. That is, for adults, dividing attention increased false memory
levels. What this finding implies is that there is a developmental shift in the effects of divided
attention on children’s and adults’ false memory production. To our knowledge, we are the first to
report such developmental shift, a shift that has considerable ramifications for our understanding
of the development of children’s and adults’ false memory.
Our finding suggests that manipulations that target conscious processing (e.g., divided
attention) result in marked quantitative and qualitative differences in children’s and adults’ false
memories. For children, divided attention likely affected the understanding of the true items such
that detailed understanding of those items was impaired. This possibly prevented the process of
spreading activation (AAT/AMT) and gist extraction (FTT) thereby lowering false memories
relative to the full attention condition. For adults, divided attention made them rely more on
themes that were activated during presentation (AAT) or on gist traces that were extracted (FTT),
leading to an increase in false memory levels.  Although these findings are broadly consistent with
the expectations of most theories of false memory development, only AAT predicted the
qualitative differences between children’s and adults’ false memories (e.g., differences in
automaticity).
Alternatively, the rise in adults’ false recall during divided attention might partly be
explained by participants’ difficulty monitoring the occurrence of critical lures (Perez-Mata et al.,
2002) or by a shift in response criterion (Dewhurst et al., 2007). It is likely that divided attention
prevented adults from encoding and identifying the cognitive processes and phenomenological
characteristics related to false memories. This could have resulted in the fact that adults were
unaware that they produced false memories during divided attention. This interpretation is
consistent with AMT’s prediction that divided attention during encoding makes adults less able to
monitor their memory accuracy, resulting in more inferential processing (Roediger et al., 2001b).
This increased inferential processing leads to more activation of related items (critical lures) in an
associative network. Because in adults, these critical lures were strongly activated during
encoding under divided attention conditions, they contained features similar to those of actual list
items. Hence, during retrieval, adults in the divided attention condition were more likely to
recollect critical items than adults in the full attention condition.  Of course, the increase in adults’
false recall may be the result of a criterion shift in which adults are aware that their memory is
impaired during divided attention and then compensate by falsely recalling related but incorrect
items. Despite the fact that our data are silent to which explanation offers the best fit, our recall
findings concur well with those found by others (Dewhurst et al., 2007; Perez-Mata et al., 2002;
Peters et al., 2008).
Interestingly, developmental shifts are rarely seen in memory development research and
therefore highlight the need to examine developmental trends and reversals in false memories. For
example, Brainerd et al. (2008) showed that under certain circumstances (e.g., when studying
spontaneous false memories), the traditional view of false memories (i.e., fewer false memories as
children get older) is entirely reversed with children having fewer false memories than adults. Our
finding that children’s and adults’ false recall react oppositely when attention is divided adds to
the growing body of evidence showing that there exist quantitative as well as qualitative
differences in the processes that drive children’s and adults’ false memories (Wimmer & Howe,
2010).
Reliable support for our developmental effect comes from three sources. First, we showed
that across all age groups, divided attention significantly reduced true recall, a finding that is
consistent with previous research (Dewhurst et al., 2007). This means that our manipulation
affected both children’s and adults’ true memory in a similar and uniform manner. Second, we
found an age-related increase in false memories for the 7- and 11-year-old children. This result is
in line with a host of studies showing a developmental increase in the number of false memories
for younger (7/8-year-olds) and older children (11/12-year-olds) (Brainerd et al., 2008; Howe et
al., 2010; but see below). Third, a developmental reversal was obtained for the divided attention
manipulation for false recall.  That is, whereas divided attention decreased children’s false
memories, divided attention increased adults’ false memories. However, our results also showed
that although divided attention reduced younger children’s false memory levels, this effect was
not significant. Obviously, this is likely due to floor effects as younger children’s false memory
rates were already very low in the full attention condition, a finding observed before in the
literature (Brainerd et al., 2008).
Although we found an age-related increase in false memories for the 7- and 11-year-olds,
this increase did not monotonically continue to adults. That is, we failed to find the standard
developmental pattern in false memories in which adults develop more false memories than older
children who in turn have higher false memory rates than younger children (Brainerd et al., 2008).
The reason for this may be the relatively low levels of false memories for adults in the full
attention condition. This finding has also been reported by Wimmer and Howe (2010) who also
demonstrated that false recognition was very low for adults under full attention. Although
speculative, one possible explanation for this might be differences in populations and individual
variations in false memory vulnerability (Bouwmeester & Verkoeijen, 2010).
In the present study, we also showed that neutral and negative false memories were
similarly affected by divided attention. That is, in the full and divided attention condition, neutral
false memories were more easily elicited than negative false memories in both adults and children.
This result corresponds to previous developmental research (Howe et al., 2010) and is related with
work showing that negative emotion leads to fewer memory errors than positive emotion
(Kensinger & Schachter, 2006). Our finding suggests that emotion plays an important role in false
memory creation and that valence effects might be developmentally invariant.
We also found that divided attention significantly reduced adults’, but not children’s, net
accuracy. Although children’s false memory rates were significantly affected by divided attention,
their net accuracy was not. This finding implies that children’s memory accuracy is resistant to
manipulations that impact conscious processing and, like our false memory findings, suggest that
there are important differences between children’s and adults’ memory functioning.
To recap, the present study showed that divided attention differentially affected children’s
and adults’ false memories. Specifically, our study showed that children’s false memory levels,
like their true recall, were lowered when attention was divided.  In contrast for adults, although
their true recall was also lowered in divided attention conditions, false memory levels were
enhanced.  This result is consistent with the idea that false memories are automatically activated
in associative memory during encoding for adults and to a lesser extent in children but are not so
automatically activated at retrieval for children (Howe, 2005; Howe & Wilkinson, 2011). Equally
important, our study is the first showing a developmental shift concerning the effect of divided
attention on false memories, a shift that occurred irrespective of valence-arousal.  Our results
suggest that besides qualitative differences (see Wimmer & Howe, 2010), there also exist
quantitative differences between children’s and adults’ false memories.
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Appendix A. Mean values of valence, arousal, concreteness, familiarity, and meaningfulness of
critical lures (CL) and wordlists (WL) 1
|               |Valence   |Arousal   |Concreteness |Familiarit|Meaningfulness |
|               |          |          |             |y         |               |
|Bread-CL       |-*        |-         |622          |611       |484            |
|Bread-WL       |3.62      |5.80      |550          |558       |474            |
|Window-CL      |5.91      |3.97      |609          |621       |507            |
|Window-WL      |5.74      |4.01      |512          |535       |456            |
|Sweet-CL       |-         |-         |463          |570       |495            |
|Sweet-WL       |6.48      |4.37      |487          |575       |490            |
|Smoke-CL       |-         |-         |541          |596       |534            |
|Smoke-WL       |4.70      |5.24      |671          |548       |480            |
|Foot-CL        |5.02      |3.27      |558          |583       |435            |
|Foot-WL        |5.52      |4.05      |568          |574       |458            |
|Murder-CL      |-         |-         |445          |528       |536            |
|Murder-WL      |2.47      |6.64      |457          |490       |490            |
|Pain-CL        |2.13      |6.50      |426          |569       |557            |
|Pain-WL        |4.55      |5.24      |533          |570       |512            |
|Punishment-CL  |2.22      |5.93      |358          |515       |-              |
|Punishment-WL  |4.16      |5.26      |489          |534       |458            |
|Dead-CL        |1.61      |4.59      |429          |581       |497            |
|Dead-WL        |3.57      |4.94      |491          |516       |447            |
|Cry-CL         |-         |-         |436          |566       |444            |
|Cry-WL         |6.85      |6.44      |448          |530       |509            |
*Since we used English equivalents of our Dutch words, some ratings were not available
Footnote
1For some words of the lists, there were no ratings available. Hence, the reported values should be
interpreted with extreme caution. Furthermore, the reported values have the following ranges:
Valence (1 = unpleasant, 9 = pleasant), arousal (1 = calm, 9 = excited), concreteness (100-700
with higher values indicating more concreteness), familiarity (100-700 with higher values
referring to more familiarity), and meaningfulness (100-700 with higher values denoting more
meaningfulness)
Table 1
Mean proportions and standard deviations (between parentheses) of true recall as a function of
age (7-year-olds, 11-year-olds, and adults) and condition (full attention and divided attention)
|             |Full attention             |Divided attention          |
|Age          |Neutral      |Negative     |Neutral      |Negative     |
|7-year-olds  |.43 (.11)    |.42 (.11)    |.33 (.08)    |.30 (.08)    |
|11-year-olds |.64 (.09)    |.58 (.09)    |.52 (.08)    |.50 (.10)    |
|Adults       |.80 (.09)    |.83 (.09)    |.71 (.07)    |.69 (.07)    |
Table 2
Mean proportions and standard deviations (between parentheses) of false recall as a function of
age (7-year-olds, 11-year-olds, and adults) and condition (full attention and divided attention)
|             |Full attention             |Divided attention          |
|Age          |Neutral      |Negative     |Neutral      |Negative     |
|7-year-olds  |.21 (.20)    |.09 (.13)    |.15 (.19)    |.09 (.12)    |
|11-year-olds |.42 (.19)    |.24 (.23)    |.32 (.22)    |.17 (.17)    |
|Adults       |.17 (.19)    |.10 (.12)    |.32 (.27)    |.21 (.17)    |
Table 3
Mean proportions and standard deviations (between parentheses) of net accuracy as a function of
age (7-year-olds, 11-year-olds, and adults) and condition (full attention and divided attention)
|             |Full attention             |Divided attention          |
|Age          |Neutral      |Negative     |Neutral      |Negative     |
|7-year-olds  |.73 (.21)    |.86 (.19)    |.77 (.21)    |.83 (.22)    |
|11-year-olds |.62 (.14)    |.75 (.21)    |.66 (.18)    |.79 (.20)    |
|Adults       |.85 (.15)    |.91 (.11)    |.73 (.17)    |.80 (.15)    |
